Human Factors in Unmanned Systems Case Study

The case study that was done during this course was extremely effective in promoting wider research into my chosen topic.  While I had done similar research for previous classes the case study had me dig even deeper and learn new aspects to the issue of how poor human factors design of UAS Ground Control Stations (GCS) negatively effect UAS flight operations.  A significant portion of UAS accidents have human factors attributed as either a main or contributing factor.  “Studies indicate that human factors are involved in 69% of all UAS mishaps; of these, 24% of mishaps are attributed to HF/E shortfalls in ground control station (GCS) designs.” (Waraich, Mazzuchi, Sarkani, & Rico, 2013, p. 25)  This is a significant number and it may be an even greater percentage due to poor UAS accident reporting and investigation in the past.  Implementing human factors from the beginning in all aspects of UAS design is critical, but GCS design needs to take top priority.  “In 1996, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) identified the human/system interface as the greatest deficiency in current UAS designs.” (Williams, 2006, p. 1)

Not only did this case study increase my general knowledge of this issue and its potential impacts on the future development and implementation of UAS, especially in the commercial sector it also made me more aware of what is needed to fix this issue.  The case study encouraged and required a higher level of critical thinking which expanded my knowledge and understanding of this issue.  To help improve this project and to encourage greater collaboration among class members a group paper might be considered.  Having a project with greater collaboration where each member is required to prepare a section of a larger paper and has to work with their fellow classmates to fit it all together might be a good idea.  More outside the box thinking and different points of view and perspectives may be gained by this type of project.  Overall this was a very interesting and helpful project that greatly increased my knowledge of UAS human factors issues.

References

Waraich, Q. R., Mazzuchi, T. A., Sarkani, S., & Rico, D. F. (2013, January 17). Minimizing Human Factors Mishaps in Unmanned Aircraft Systems [Feature]. Ergonomics in Design: The Quarterly of Human Factors Applications.

Williams, K. W. (2006). Human Factors Implications of Unmanned Aircraft Accidents: Flight-Control Problems (DOT/FAA/AM-06/8). Retrieved from https://erau.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-15992131-dt-content-rid-77953971_4/institution/Worldwide_Online/ASCI_GR_Courses/ASCI_638/External_Links/M7_Readings_Human_Factors_Implications_of_Unmanned_Aircraft_Accidents







   

Morallity of Military UAS

UAS Ethics and Morality

Daryl Hosler II

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

ASCI 638

Prof. Timothy Houston

 

UAS Ethics and Morality

Introduction

The question of whether or not UAS or drones in the true sense of the word are acceptable to use on warfare is a settled issue.  UAS and drones have been in military use since the end of World War I with the “Kettering Bug” and have been continuously used and adapted for different missions since those early days.  Weaponized UAS are nothing new either, there were even nuclear armed UAS back in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  The U.S. Navy used the QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter) to hunt Soviet submarines with nuclear depth charges and homing torpedoes.  (Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation, 2013)  These systems have been used in various reconnaissance roles from Vietnam through the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The question is not whether it is ethical to have UAS for military purposes but what are the ethical boundaries and constraints for using them.

Military UAS Morality

This question is now becoming more relevant not because of the proliferation of military UAVs but because of the rapid advance of technology, specifically technology allowing greater levels of autonomy for the UAS.  The big question is how much autonomy are we going to allow UAS to have and dare we give them the ability to shoot targets without direct human involvement.  This is where the true question lies.  While autonomy seems like a rather simple and easily understood term while regarding UAS it is a complex and confusing term.  Many UAVs today have high levels of autonomy when it comes to flying, but have to have direct human control for any weapons engagement.  Is this type of autonomy bad?  Some UAS currently under development can make their own flight plans, evade enemy air defenses, evade enemy aircraft, and locate their assigned target without direct human input.  Is this level of autonomy too much?  Is the breaking point where the UAS decides to kill a target, even a human being, without any input from a human operator?  “Autonomy has also been defined as the ability to pull the trigger, without a human initiation or confirmation.” (Johansson, 2011, p. 280)  Allowing UAS the ability to make the “kill” decision without human input is where the line needs to be drawn.  Human logic, reasoning, empathy, decision making ability is needed for this type of decision.  Even if we look at the future and the possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) that may be said to possess these capabilities it is still not an acceptable idea.  AIs would not be human.  Their core beliefs, morality, and ethics will most likely be different than ours.  They would not be killing one of their species, therefore they would not assign the same decision criteria making them unsuitable for this type of decision making.  Machines of any kind should never be allowed to target and kill without direct input and authorization from a human being.

Conclusion

The use of unmanned systems of any type, air, sea, or land in and of itself is not morally wrong and has been a common practice in the military for almost a century now.  The question comes in how they will be used and what level of autonomy will they be given.  UAS are extremely useful tools of war and in most cases there is nothing morally wrong in their use, even in killing targets as long as a human is “in-the-loop” and making those kill decisions.  It becomes morally wrong when there is no human in the kill decision.  No unmanned system should ever be allowed to fire at targets without direct human involvement. 

 

References

Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation. (2013). http://www.gyrodynehelicopters.com/

Johansson, L. (2011, September). Is It Morally Right to Use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in War? Philosophy & Technology, 24(3), 279-291. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/1023032172?accountid=27203

 

Civilian UAS Operator Selection

This paper required looking at how to select crewmembers for commercial flight operations using both the Insitu ScanEagle UAS and the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper variant Ikhana.  The mission would be oceanic research with both aircraft .  While no current regulations are written to define the requirements for commercial use of these aircraft possible requirements can be extrapolated from current sources.  Some of these sources include the DCMA Instruction 8210.1, Unmanned Aircraft Pilot Medical and Certification Requirements by Kevin Williams, Ph.D, and the recently released proposed sUAS rules from the FAA.

UAS Operator Selection

Daryl Hosler II

                                                      Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

ASCI 638

Prof. Timothy Houston

March 5, 2015

UAS Operator Selection

Introduction

While there have been no formal rules for civilian UAS operator/pilot qualifications yet published for UAS the size of the ScanEagle or the Ikhana there are some sources that can be referenced to get an idea of what may be required.  There were some preliminary qualification standards as well as certification and medical standards published around 2007.  There is also the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Publication 8210.1 which lays out civilian contractor requirements to fly UAS for the military.  The FAA has recently released proposed rules for civilian commercial flight of UAS under 40 lbs.  These flight operations were fairly restrictive at under 400’ AGL and within VLOS (visual observer with good communications acceptable).  While these are small UAS, smaller even than the ScanEagle which is almost 50 lbs. when fully loaded possible requirements for larger UAS can be extrapolated with this guideline and other sources.

ScanEagle

The ScanEagle is a small UAS at 48.5 lbs. max takeoff weight and can carry and EO/IR payload.  This aircraft does have an extended endurance time of 24+ hours and ceiling of 19,500’ and a range of up to 55 NM from the control station. ("ScanEagle," 2013)  While these capabilities are impressive for such a small UAS the payload limitations and range would limit this UAS to VFR flights for this particular mission.

Because this would most likely be a VFR only operation the requirements would most like be having to pass a VFR knowledge test as well as meeting the qualification requirements for the aircraft, either civilian (if available) or military. (Williams, n.d., p. 3)  Ideally crewmembers would already be qualified on this aircraft with operational experience to minimize training time.  The operator would also need to have a safe flying record and associated references to their maturity and skill level.  If already qualified ScanEagle operators were not available operators with experience in similar systems and a minimum number of hours (i.e. 500 hrs. minimum UAS time) would be set so that training would be limited to airframe qualification.

Ikhana

The Ikhana is an MQ-9 Reaper variant which is designed to fly at approximately 40,000 to 45,000 with extensive payload capability. ("NASA Ikhana," 2008)  This is a research aircraft and will be used for maritime operations which means it will most likely be flown at high altitude requiring it to be flown under an IFR flight plan with an IFR rated pilot.  Current regulations military and government regulation for contractor pilots that fly outside restricted airspace are required to have at a minimum an FAA Commercial Pilot or Airline Transport Pilot Certificate.  However, this does not apply to UAS.  For UAS the regulation says that UAS pilots will meet Service (military service) requirements.  This means that if the UAS operator is qualified to fly the UAS for that branch of service they are authorized the aircraft. (Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA], 2013, Chapter 4) Particular cases such as flying IFR will currently be stipulated in the Certificate of Authorization (COA) and will usually require the pilot to have at least a Private Pilot Certificate and IFR rating with 100 hours PIC time.

Looking to future requirements gong along with the trend of the recent proposed requirements for flying sUAS the pilots for this aircraft would most likely require the pilot to pass at least a written UAS IFR flight test as well as passing a flight review with the aircraft, currency requirements, and hour requirements. (Williams, n.d., p. 3)  For this system if a UAS specific IFR rating is not yet available it would require the Ikhana pilots/operators to have at a minimum a Commercial Pilot Certificate with an IFR rating.  This is to allow the aircraft to fly under IFR flight plans, provide the required level of knowledge and training, and permit commercial operations with the aircraft.

Training and Qualification and Selection

The pilots will need to undergo regular proficiency flights, recurrent flight evaluations, and regular academic testing to ensure a high level of proficiency.  Flight operations would have a minimum number of hours that must be flow (either quarterly or bi-annually), regular no-notice examinations, and a yearly comprehensive proficiency test to ensure continued pilot safety as well knowledge and skill retention.

The selection process would include a written flight aptitude test such as used by the Global Pilot Selection System, or modeled after a military flight aptitude test. (Global Pilot Selection System, 2011)  Simulator flights would need to be done to determine the potential operators flight skills, knowledge, and ability to handle emergencies.  Evaluation of crew resource management understanding and application would also be implemented.

 

 

References

Defense Contract Management Agency. (2013). Contractor’s FLight and Ground Operations. Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/95_Series_Collection_1.html

Global Pilot Selection System. (2011, January 26). GPSS (Global pilot selection system) for ab-initio pilots [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3rHEBvKBJA

NASA-Large UAS Aircraft (Ikhana). (2008). Retrieved from http://www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/research/ESCD/ikhana.html

ScanEagle System. (2013). Retrieved March 5, 2015, from http://www.insitu.com/systems/scaneagle

Williams, K. W. (n.d.). Unmanned Aircraft Pilot Medical and Certification Requirements. Retrieved from Federal Aviation Administration: http://www.hf.faa.gov/HFPortalNew/Search/DOCs/ga_UAVtraining_CAMI.pdf

 

Operational Risk Management

Daryl Hosler II

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

Human Factors in Unmanned Systems

ASCI 638

Prof. Timothy Houston

 

Operational Risk Management

Introduction

This paper will be based on a Silver Fox D1 sUAS risk management process for a combat ISR mission in Afghanistan.  Not all risks were identified and evaluated, only a sampling was used to represent the process.

Preliminary Hazard List (PHL)

The Preliminary Hazard list is used to identify risks to flight operations.  Appendix A shows the Composite Risk Management (CRM) worksheet with the hazards identified.  Many of these hazards are centered on the take off and recovery of the aircraft.  These are critical phases that are crucial for mission success and like any aircraft are the most dangerous phases of flight.  The Silver Fox has a small launcher than can easily be turned into the wind as needed without a lengthy delay to flight operations.  To maximize safety and the chance of operational success a launch and recovery site should be found where there a wide range of takeoff and landing directions available.

During landing each landing direction has to be surveyed and leveled and cleared for safe recovery.  A thorough site survey to find a launch and recovery area where multiple landing areas are available to meet the prevailing winds of the area is vital.  High Density Altitude (DA) can have a large impact on flight operations especially if the aircraft engine performance is not optimal.  Weight and DA takeoff limits can be severely limited with poor engine performance so this is a very important due to possible aircraft damage if takeoff is attempted outside of system limits. 

The risks are higher during combat missions especially if an enemy presence is known.  While the Silver Fox has no Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) it is very quiet and small making it easy to avoid detection with appropriate planning.

Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA)

The PHA provides an initial risk assessment value to show what level of risk each particular hazard presents to flight operations.  Appendix A shows the Composite Risk Management worksheet as well as the Risk Assessment Matrix which shows how to categorize each hazard with an initial risk assessment value.

Operational Hazard Review and Analysis (OHR&A)          

The CRM worksheet in Appendix A also show the OHR&A.  Each hazard is evaluated to find mitigating factors that can reduce the risk value for hazard.  These are steps that can be taken at all levels and implemented when needed to reduce the risk assessment to an acceptable level.  After the mission is flown the hazards and their mitigation steps are evaluated to decide whether they were effective or not.  If they steps were effective they can remain in place.  If they are not effective or only partially effective they can be modified or changed completely as needed.

Operational Risk Management Assessment Tool

The ORM tool that was used for this mission takes into account all factors that may effect the mission.  These factors include weather considerations at takeoff, mission altitude, and landing.  It also takes into account crew factors such as experience, training level and crew rest.  It also looks at aircraft configuration, night or day mission, and whether or not new equipment or software is being used.  After evaluating all of these factors and assigning the appropriate risk value an overall risk value is then tabulated to provide the risk level which in this case was Low.  The ORM also identifies the appropriate mission approval authority.

 

 

Appendix A.

Silver Fox D1 CRM Worksheet

Figure 1. This figure show the CRM worksheet that encompasses all of the steps for the process.  The identified hazards are only a representative example. (Department of the Army [DA], 2014)

 

 

Figure 2. This figure shows the CRM matrix used to classify and quantify risks and risk mitigation factors. (DA, 2014, table 3-3)

 

Appendix B.

Silver Fox D1 Operational Risk Management Worksheet

 

Figure 3. This figure shows the Operational Risk Management or Risk Assessment Worksheet for the Silver Fox D1 mission.

 

References

Department of the Army. (2010). DA PAM 385-90 Army Aviation Accident Prevention Program. Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/385_Series_Collection_1.html

Department of the Army. (2014). DA PAM 385-30 Risk Management. Retrieved from http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/385_Series_Collection_1.html

Shappee, E. J. (2012). Safety Assessments. In R. K. Barnhart, S. B. Hottman, D. M. Marshall, & E. Shappee (Eds.), Introduction to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (pp. 123-135). Retrieved from http://site.ebrary.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/lib/erau/reader.action?docID=

10508871

Boeing 787 and MQ-1C ATLS Systems

Boeing 787 and MQ-1C ATLS Systems

Boeing 787

The Boeing 787 has a full Autoland capability where the aircraft is able to land using its redundant autopilot systems, GPS/INS systems, and FAA certified approach plate database.  The pilot of the aircraft selects the approach that is required and then selects the Autoland system for the approach.  The pilot is capable of taking control and landing manually or aborting the approach at any time.  This system has full control of the aircraft and will even keep the aircraft on the centerline of the runway, slow down, brake, and stop the aircraft without input from the pilot.  Once the plane stops the pilot must then take control of the airplane to taxi off the runway and to the terminal.  The crew of the aircraft is required to keep current on this system and must do an Autoland approach on a regular basis to keep proficient with this system.

The only downside to this system like any automated system is the risk of complacency and putting too much trust into the system.  Because the pilots are not actively engaged in the landing other than as a system monitor there is a higher chance of distractions and inattention.  This must be overcome with training and discipline.  I don’t see any other limitations to this system since the plane can be reverted to fully manual control at any time.  Future improvements will likely involve more automated aborts if approach limitations are exceeded and more accurate navigation equipment.

MQ-1C Gray Eagle

The MQ-1C Gray Eagle has a very extensive Automatic Takeoff and Landing System (ATLS) which utilizes GPS/INS/DGPS systems as well as a backup system call Tactical Automated Landing System (TALS) which uses a ground based navigation system to takeoff and land the aircraft.  The GPS/INS/DGPS system on this aircraft is very accurate with an accuracy of less than 1 meter and the TALS system has similar accuracy.  The runway is surveyed using the aircraft GPS and the GCS is surveyed as well for DGPS capability and the ATLS mission is then loaded to the aircraft.  When the operator is ready for takeoff or landing he selects the desired runway, puts the aircraft within the required parameters and then selects land or take off.  For takeoff the aircraft accelerates and becomes airborne with the system capable of automatic aborts for system, emergency, or environmental (winds) conditions or it can be aborted manually by the operator prior to rotation of the aircraft.  After lift off the pilot is able to command heading changes at 50’ AGL and full control at 300’ AGL.  For landing the auto aborts are the same and the operator can manually abort all the way until touchdown.  After touchdown the aircraft tracks the runway and brakes to a stop without input from the operator.  After the aircraft stops the operator takes manual control of the aircraft to taxi off the runway.  The aircraft does have the capability of being configured to have a backup GCS with full manual control as with other Predator aircraft however this capability will be going away shortly because the Army does not want full manual control of the aircraft.  The operator can override all automatic aborts to force the aircraft to land but this can lead to a crash if too far outside system capabilities.

The TALS works in a similar manner to the normal ATLS system but works with a ground based navigation unit that has its own TALS GDT like antenna that takes control of the aircraft and lands it when selected.  The primary purpose of the TALS system is as a backup in case GPS capability is degraded or lost for any reason.

There are negatives to this system.  Because the runway has to be surveyed prior to being able to takeoff or land from it the aircraft is unable to land at another runway if it is unable to land at its home field.  Future capabilities may allow the aircraft to land at alternate fields but this is not available at this time.  Because there will be no full manual control if the aircraft is unable to land for any reason the only option is to ditch the aircraft in a safe area.  This would be a major problem if the aircraft was attempting to land in a large metropolitan area with few or no safe ditching areas which is a hindrance to this aircraft flying in the NAS.  More flexibility and is going to be required of this system to allow full integration into the NAS.

References

Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2014). TM DTM 1-1550-696-10-1 Operator’s Manual for MQ-1C Unmanned Aircraft System Block 1 (NSN 1550-01-569-8864). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

JustPlanes. (2014, June 15). PilotCAM 787 Autoland into Brussels Rwy 01 [Video file]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2zllukY-

Crew Shift Schedules Comparison

Shift Work Schedules

Introduction

Shift work is always a challenge no matter what field of work a person is in but with a highly demanding and technical field like aviation it only compounds already high levels of fatigue and stress. “It is universally agreed that fatigue can adversely affect performance, that it is a very complex problem, and that it is an unavoidable consequence of operations that continue throughout all 24 hours in a day.” (Orlady & Orlady, 2012, p. 296)  I have personally had extensive experience with shift work in a variety of settings as well as within the aviation field.  I have worked on shifts in both manned and unmanned aviation in both deployed combat environments as well as normal work environments at home.  While situations such as being in austere environments in combat conditions can further exacerbate the issues brought about by shift work it is difficult no matter the work place.

Shift work has many effects on work performance and your life in general.  One effect is having a constant feeling of fatigue and tiredness due to ever changing shift schedules.  This can be magnified by frequently rotating shift schedules that do not allow the person to ever get fully adapted to their shift.  Family life is often disrupted causing psychosocial issues from home which then causes degraded work performance because of the strife at home.  Along with these issues rapidly rotating shift work can have negative impact on a person’s circadian rhythm causing because of environmental factors such as trying to sleep during the day with too much light and an uncomfortable sleep environment. This can also lead to physiological or self-imposed stressors that are an attempt to overcome the other stressors.

This paper will look at two different shift work schedules and look at their strengths and weaknesses to help determine what the most acceptable schedule is.  No matter what schedule is used shift-work, especially at night will always cause problems.  Optimizing the schedule and making other provisions can only minimize the impact of this type of work schedule.

Weekly Rotating Schedule

This schedule has four teams working a total of three shifts (Day, Swing, Night) with the crews working a six days on two days off schedule.  Figure 1 shows this schedule in an Excel® worksheet format.  This is the schedule used by an MQ-1 Predator unit that is talked about in some of our source material.  The benefits and negative aspects of this schedule will now be looked at.

Figure 1. This shows the original six days on two days off weekly shift change schedule. (Houston, 2015, table 1)

Positive Attributes

This schedule has a couple of positive attributes, one of them being that the rotation schedule goes from days to swings and then to nights before repeating.  This is an easier shifting schedule than going the other way or having more random shift changes. 

While changing shifts on a weekly basis is not my preferred schedule and I do think there are many negative aspects to this the positive side is that no crewmember has to be on extended night shifts.  This may help mitigate family and other life issues.  Night shift operations has been shown to have negative effects on crew performance no matter how rested they are.

Providing two days off together is also a very positive aspect of this schedule.  If days off are broken up then the crewmember spends their day off trying to catch up on everything they have not been able to do during the work week and does not get the amount of rest and relaxation that is required.

Negative Attributes

The number one negative attribute that I see with this schedule is the weekly shift change.  While this has some positive effects as noted above I feel that the negative effects far outweigh the positive ones.  Working at night is known to degrade performance and not allowing the operator to fully adjust to the night shift makes the problem worse.  “The results supported our notion that the night missions affected detection and recognition performance.” (Barnes, 1998, p. 2)  By changing shifts on a weekly basis the crewmember is never able to get fully adapted to their shift and reach optimal performance.  While working a night shift will always have negative effects on performance allowing the crewmember to get fully adapted to this shift will allow them to minimize the negative effects of this shift and provide a higher level of performance.  By changing shifts weekly you will always have a non-adapted crew flying at night making an already less than optimal situation even worse.

Monthly Rotating Schedule

This schedule has three teams working the same three shifts as the original schedule.  The fourth team has been assimilated into the other three teams to provide extra personnel so that days off and standby flight crews are available in case of illness or other personnel shortages.  This schedule has the teams rotating on a minimum of a monthly basis but can be extended for as long as desired but I would recommend no more than four month rotations.  Figure 2 shows this monthly rotation schedule in an Excel® worksheet.  The positive and negatives of this schedule will now be looked at.

Figure 2. This shows the monthly shift rotation schedule.  The original six days on and two days off schedule can be maintained.

Positive Attributes

I think there are several improvements that this schedule can provide.  By keeping crews on the same shift for at least a month but no more than four months at a time this allows the crews to be fully adapted to their shift and be able to perform at a more optimal level. 

This shift also provides more personnel per shift which gives more flexibility for things such as days on and days off as well as possibly allowing crewmembers to switch out more frequently helping to alleviate other issues such as boredom and increased fatigue from extended time in the GCS.

Negative Attributes

There is only one negative attribute for this schedule in my experience and opinion.  That negative attribute is that there may be a slightly elevated level of family and life problems due to a longer period working on the night shift.  This can be mitigated by selecting the duration (1-4 months) that is the best compromise with the crews and their families.  This can also be alleviated by allowing crewmembers to change teams if a particular shift does not work for them they can find someone to trade with.

Conclusion

In my opinion and experience with working shift work in the aviation field the positive attributes of the monthly shift change schedule far outweigh the benefits of the weekly shift change schedule.  During a study of an MQ-1 Predator unit that was experiencing high levels of stress and fatigue they tried to rearrange their schedule to improve performance. “The squadron work schedule was redesigned but preferred shift work practices were not fully implemented because of manpower constraints and crewmember preferences.” (Tvaryanas, Platte, Swigart, Colebank, & Miller, 2008, p. iii)  This manpower problem can at least be partially alleviate with the monthly shift change schedule by dispersing the fourth shift crewmembers among the other three shifts.  Changing shifts on a weekly basis never allows the crewmember to fully adapt to any shift and their circadian rhythm and rest cycles will always be in turmoil putting higher levels of stress on the crewmember and never allow them to work at an optimal level.  The monthly shift change schedule allows for better crewmember performance while having enough flexibility to adapt for individual and unit requirements which makes the preferred schedule in my opinion.

References

Barnes, M. J. (1998). Crew Simultaiions for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Applications: Sustained effects, shift factors, interface issues, and crew size [Supplement]. Proceedigs of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society...Annual Meeting, 1. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/docview/235508094?accountid=27203

Houston, T. (2015). 6 On 2 Off Rotating Shift Schedule [Excel Worksheet]. Retrieved from https://erau.blackboard.com/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab_tab_group_id=_2_1&url=%2Fwebapps%2Fblackboard%2Fexecute%2Flauncher%3Ftype%3DCourse%26id%3D_1035384_1

Orlady, H. W., & Orlady, L. M. (2012). Human Factors in Multi-Crew Flight Operations. Farnham, Surrey, GU9 7PT England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

Thompson, W. T., Lopez, N., Hickey, P., DaLuz, C., Caldwell, J. L., & Tvaryanas, A. P. (2006). Effects of Shift Work and Sustained Operations: Operator Performance in Remotely Piloted Aircraft (OP-REPAIR) (HSW-PE-BR-TR-2006-0001). Retrieved from : : .

Tvaryanas, A. P., Platte, W., Swigart, C., Colebank, J., & Miller, N. L. (2008). A Resurvey of Shift Work-Related Fatigue in MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft Systems Crewmembers (NPS-OR-08-001). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Introduction

The MQ-1C Gray Eagle has two options for operating BLOS: Air Data Relay (ADT) and Satellite Communications (SATCOM).  SATCOM is the primary BLOS capability while ADT is a backup system in case SATCOM is not available for some reason.  SATCOM requires minimal extra equipment while ADT requires a considerably larger footprint.  There are some human factors considerations while operating in BLOS especially when using the SATCOM mode.  Finally we will look at some possible commercial applications for BLOS operations with either the Gray Eagle or other systems similar in size and capability.

SATCOM

Satellite communications is the primary BLOS capability for the MQ-1C Gray Eagle as well as other UAS of similar size and capability, especially aircraft in the Predator family.  SATCOM uses orbiting military and commercial satellites to provide data link capability for the UAS BLOS and the Ground Control Station (GCS) can be located anywhere in the world, many times thousands of miles from the operational aircraft and theater.

SATCOM operation requires a different GDT which is called a Satellite Ground Data Terminal (SGDT) and a larger air data terminal dish antenna to conduct these operations.  The SGDT is much larger and more complex than the LOS GDT but requires very little extra consideration by the operator.  No extra personnel is required for SATCOM operations and handover to SATCOM operations is relatively simple.  After the UAS is launched using the LOS GDT the aircraft will climb to operational altitude and prepare for SATCOM handover.  The aircraft has two ADTs and modem assemblies. They are the modem assembly (MA) and the satellite modem assembly (SMA).   The MA is used for LOS operations only and the SMA can be used for both LOS and BLOS operations.  The LOS GDT will communicate with the MA while the SMA is used to gain data link with the required satellite(s).  When data link is established with the satellites LOS data link is turned off and the aircraft can then conduct SATCOM BLOS operations.

Air Data Relay

The ADT is used as a backup BLOS system in case SATCOM operations are not available.  ADR operations use only LOS equipment and antennas for its BLOS operations.  This operation requires a considerable amount of additional equipment and crew.  ADR basically takes double the equipment of normal LOS operations including two aircraft.  ADR operations consist of one aircraft acting as a Data Relay aircraft for a second mission aircraft.  Two GCSs are also required, a launch and recovery (LRE) GCS and a mission GCS.  The launch and recovery GCS will launch the relay aircraft (RAC) and hand it off the mission GCS. The mission GCS then puts the RAC into a loiter at a predetermined point and prepares to receive the mission aircraft (MAC).  The LRE GCS then hands off the MAC to the mission GCS who then uses the two ADTs on the RAC to monitor and control the RAC while controlling the MAC through the RAC.  This in theory doubles the range of the MAC and is limited only to the operational range of the aircraft and its ability to complete the mission and have enough fuel to return to base and land.  LOS datalink is only limited to LOS capability and with the RAC at max operational altitude of 25,000’ MSL this as stated earlier will limit the MAC aircraft to its ability to return to base and land.

Human Factors Issues

The human factors issues that can arise from these operations is that there will be a time delay in commands given to the aircraft because of the greater distances and extra components (satellites, RAC, etc.).  For ADR operations the time delay should be minimal while the SATCOM delay can be significant enough to impact payload and weapons operation.  While useable in SATCOM payload and weapons operations require a high level of experience and expertise with certain limitations.  SATCOM delay can be as long as 6 seconds from the time a command is sent until the aircraft receives it and responds.

Commercial Applications

There are many commercial applications that could benefit from the use of BLOS capability in a UAS but it will most likely be restricted to only the largest corporations and local governments due to the large increase in operational cost and equipment footprint.  Because BLOS equipment is considerably more expensive and complex and satellite time can cost in excess of $10,000 an hour there will probably be limited commercial use of BLOS operations. 

Some applications that could benefit from BLOS UAS operations would be infrastructure monitoring in remote areas including over water missions, wildlife monitoring in remote areas and over water, and other extended range and time research missions.

References

Department of the Army. (2014). TC 3-04.63:  MQ-1C Unmanned Aircraft System Commander’s Aircrew Training Program and Aircrew Training Manual. Retrieved from https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html

UAS Integration into the NAS

UAS Integration in the NAS

Introduction

The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) that is currently being developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and it aviation industry partners is looking to modernize the current National Airspace System.  NextGen will be a Global Positioning System (GPS) based system rather than the radar based system that we currently use.  While Next Gen is composed of many other components than GPS this feature is what will assist in the integration of UAS into the National Airspace (NAS).

A major factor in the safe operation of UAS in the NAS is the sense-and-avoid capability (SAA) that many systems are lacking at this time.  While several SAA systems are currently under development none of them have been operationally deployed.  UAS will need to meet or exceed the same level of SAA that manned aircraft do.  Figure 1 shows a comparison of SAA between manned and unmanned aircraft.

Figure 1. A comparison between manned and unmanned aircraft SAA capabilities. (MITRE Corporation, 2011, slide 5)

NextGen

Next Gen is a new Air Traffic Control (ATC) system that with the use of GPS will allow more efficient flights and greater safety while allowing more planes into our already congested airspace.  By making more efficient departures, flight routes, and arrivals Next Gen will save billions of dollars in fuel costs which in turn saves fuel and is better for the environment because fewer emissions are released into the atmosphere.  Next Gen will not only save money and fuel but it will make flying more enjoyable for passengers and allow freight to be flown more efficiently and quickly due to more flights and better routes.

There are many hardware and software components that make up the NextGen system along with new regulations, procedures, and guidelines to be used by aviation industry.  UAS will need to fit into the NextGen system the same as any other aircraft.  There will be many challenges in doing so including aircraft design and aircrew training but they are not insurmountable problems.

UAS in NextGen

There are many hurdles to allowing UAS unrestricted access to the NAS.  This encompasses everything from UAS manufacturing, flight operations, crew training, aircraft capabilities, and maintenance.  Like manned aircraft UAS will need to meet FAA standards in all of these categories to be allowed to fly in the NAS.  “To gain full access to the NAS, UAS need to be able to bridge the gap from existing systems requiring accommodations to future systems that are able to obtain a standard airworthiness certificate.” (Integration, 2013, p. 6)  The Airline Pilots Association backs this sentiment up and their position is that no UAS should be allowed into the NAS until they meet all the same standards that manned aircraft do. 

“This means the aircraft must be designed to have the same types of safety features, reliable, redundant systems and maneuverability as the other airspace users. UAS operators must meet all the certification and fitness requirements of air carriers, and the ‘pilots’ flying the UAS aircraft must meet equivalent training, qualification, and licensing requirements as pilots of aircraft in the same airspace.” (Air Line Pilots Association, International [ALPA], 2011, p. 1)

While most of the requirements that the ALPA feel are necessary for UAS to fly in the NAS are sound many of them show a lack of understanding and possibly a bias to keep UAS out of the NAS.  For example, there is no valid reason that a UAS pilot needs to have the fitness requirements of manned pilot. UAS pilots remain on the ground and do not encounter the same physical stresses that manned pilots do.  While an aviation medical should be required separate guidelines will need to be established for UAS.  Currently U.S. Army UAS operators are required to have a military Class IV physical which is the same level as ATC personnel.

UAS Type

The size and use of UAS will greatly influence their ability to fly in the NAS and the limitations that will be placed on them.  While all UAS will be required to meet minimum standards their size and role will determine where and how they can fly in the NAS.  For instance, a backpack capable UAS that is being used for search and rescue applications will be very restricted on the type and amount of equipment it can carry because of size and payload capacity.  Because this type of UAS will be unable to carry the necessary equipment to fly unrestricted in the NAS and because its mission will not require this it will most likely be restricted to radio control (R/C) aircraft type restrictions.  This would limit the aircraft to flying at less than 400’ AGL and within visual range of the operator at all times.  A larger aircraft such as a Predator class UAS will be required to meet all NextGen requirements such as full sense-and-avoid capability and ADS-B along with all the other required equipment and capabilities for NextGen operations.  Because this type of UAS has the ability to carry this equipment and its mission will most likely require it they will have to meet these standards.

Human Factors

The biggest human factor that will be involved with the integration of UAS into the NAS with NextGen will be the proper design and implementation of the UAS Ground Control Station (GCS).  The GCS is already the weakest link concerning the safe flight of UAS mainly because most current generation GCSs were rushed into service for military use and did not take human factors into account.  The fact that there is no established standard for UAS GCS design across manufacturers is a major factor in this.  While current GCSs already do a poor job of providing critical information to the operator/pilot in an intuitive and easy to use format the problem will only get worse with the increased level of information equipment required by NextGen.  UAS have a leg up on many manned systems because they are already highly GPS based and this will be in the UAS favor during the transition but proper human factors considerations will be a key point that needs to be addressed.  If future GCS design does not have a human factors standard to conform to and UAS continue to have a higher than normal accident rate because of this it will severely limit the ability of UAS to fly in the NAS.

Lost Link

Because UAS are susceptible to lost link there will need to be procedures and requirements in place to standardize what a UAS does in the case of lost link.  This will again be affected by the size, type, and mission of the UAS.  Small within visual range UAS may have a requirement to return to the launch point and land immediately upon lost link while larger UAS flying Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) will need to fly to appropriate loiter areas and broadcast lost link on ADS-B and other systems. 

Current systems for UAS lost link do not give ATC a high enough confidence level that they can adequately predict and reroute traffic for safe operations.  In some cases where a working relationship has been established and ATC is fully aware of UAS lost link procedures operations can be safely conducted.  However, with full NAS integration this will not always be a viable solution.  Figure 2 shows a flow chart representing lost link reporting and ATC reaction capability.

Figure 2. UAS Lost Link Predictability flow chart. (MITRE Corporation, 2011, slide 10)

As NextGen and UAS mature larger aircraft may be able to use NextGen and SAA equipment to land autonomously at their home airport without disruption of other air traffic and greatly reducing or eliminating the predictability problem altogether.

Summary

While there are many challenges ahead for UAS to be integrated into the NAS along with NextGen it is critical that they do so.  The benefits and unique capabilities that UAS bring are vital to national defense as well as the national economy.  UAS have many capabilities that will make this transition easier such as accurate autopilots and GPS based navigation but because of their vast difference in size and capabilities UAS will require specific regulations that will differ from manned aircraft.  SAA capability and Lost Link procedures will be some of the biggest issues that will need to be resolved for this to happen.  While this will take time and a lot of work these issues are not insurmountable.

 

References

Air Line Pilots Association, International. (2011). Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Challenges for Safely Operating in the National Airspace System [White Paper]. Retrieved from http://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/pressroom/inthecockpit/UASWhitePaper.pdf

Integration of Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap [FAA Publication]. (2013). Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/ UAS_Roadmap_2013.pdf

Lacher, A. (n.d.). Design o Sensor Standards for RQ-7B Shadow under Loss-Link [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from http://catsr.ite.gmu.edu/SYST490/495_2013_UAS/UASSense-and-Avoid_Presentation.pdf

MITRE Corporation (2011). Unmanned Aircraft System Loss of Link Procedure Evaluation Methodology [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from http://seor.gmu.edu/projects/SEOR-Spring12/UL2/finalbriefingpres.pdf