Tuesday, March 10, 2015

Human Factors in Unmanned Systems Case Study

The case study that was done during this course was extremely effective in promoting wider research into my chosen topic.  While I had done similar research for previous classes the case study had me dig even deeper and learn new aspects to the issue of how poor human factors design of UAS Ground Control Stations (GCS) negatively effect UAS flight operations.  A significant portion of UAS accidents have human factors attributed as either a main or contributing factor.  “Studies indicate that human factors are involved in 69% of all UAS mishaps; of these, 24% of mishaps are attributed to HF/E shortfalls in ground control station (GCS) designs.” (Waraich, Mazzuchi, Sarkani, & Rico, 2013, p. 25)  This is a significant number and it may be an even greater percentage due to poor UAS accident reporting and investigation in the past.  Implementing human factors from the beginning in all aspects of UAS design is critical, but GCS design needs to take top priority.  “In 1996, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) identified the human/system interface as the greatest deficiency in current UAS designs.” (Williams, 2006, p. 1)

Not only did this case study increase my general knowledge of this issue and its potential impacts on the future development and implementation of UAS, especially in the commercial sector it also made me more aware of what is needed to fix this issue.  The case study encouraged and required a higher level of critical thinking which expanded my knowledge and understanding of this issue.  To help improve this project and to encourage greater collaboration among class members a group paper might be considered.  Having a project with greater collaboration where each member is required to prepare a section of a larger paper and has to work with their fellow classmates to fit it all together might be a good idea.  More outside the box thinking and different points of view and perspectives may be gained by this type of project.  Overall this was a very interesting and helpful project that greatly increased my knowledge of UAS human factors issues.

References

Waraich, Q. R., Mazzuchi, T. A., Sarkani, S., & Rico, D. F. (2013, January 17). Minimizing Human Factors Mishaps in Unmanned Aircraft Systems [Feature]. Ergonomics in Design: The Quarterly of Human Factors Applications.

Williams, K. W. (2006). Human Factors Implications of Unmanned Aircraft Accidents: Flight-Control Problems (DOT/FAA/AM-06/8). Retrieved from https://erau.blackboard.com/bbcswebdav/pid-15992131-dt-content-rid-77953971_4/institution/Worldwide_Online/ASCI_GR_Courses/ASCI_638/External_Links/M7_Readings_Human_Factors_Implications_of_Unmanned_Aircraft_Accidents







 
 
 

Monday, March 9, 2015

Morallity of Military UAS





Introduction

The question of whether or not UAS or drones in the true sense of the word are acceptable to use on warfare is a settled issue.  UAS and drones have been in military use since the end of World War I with the “Kettering Bug” and have been continuously used and adapted for different missions since those early days.  Weaponized UAS are nothing new either, there were even nuclear armed UAS back in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  The U.S. Navy used the QH-50 DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter) to hunt Soviet submarines with nuclear depth charges and homing torpedoes.  (Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation, 2013)  These systems have been used in various reconnaissance roles from Vietnam through the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The question is not whether it is ethical to have UAS for military purposes but what are the ethical boundaries and constraints for using them.

Military UAS Morality

This question is now becoming more relevant not because of the proliferation of military UAVs but because of the rapid advance of technology, specifically technology allowing greater levels of autonomy for the UAS.  The big question is how much autonomy are we going to allow UAS to have and dare we give them the ability to shoot targets without direct human involvement.  This is where the true question lies.  While autonomy seems like a rather simple and easily understood term while regarding UAS it is a complex and confusing term.  Many UAVs today have high levels of autonomy when it comes to flying, but have to have direct human control for any weapons engagement.  Is this type of autonomy bad?  Some UAS currently under development can make their own flight plans, evade enemy air defenses, evade enemy aircraft, and locate their assigned target without direct human input.  Is this level of autonomy too much?  Is the breaking point where the UAS decides to kill a target, even a human being, without any input from a human operator?  “Autonomy has also been defined as the ability to pull the trigger, without a human initiation or confirmation.” (Johansson, 2011, p. 280)  Allowing UAS the ability to make the “kill” decision without human input is where the line needs to be drawn.  Human logic, reasoning, empathy, decision making ability is needed for this type of decision.  Even if we look at the future and the possibility of artificial intelligence (AI) that may be said to possess these capabilities it is still not an acceptable idea.  AIs would not be human.  Their core beliefs, morality, and ethics will most likely be different than ours.  They would not be killing one of their species, therefore they would not assign the same decision criteria making them unsuitable for this type of decision making.  Machines of any kind should never be allowed to target and kill without direct input and authorization from a human being.

Conclusion

The use of unmanned systems of any type, air, sea, or land in and of itself is not morally wrong and has been a common practice in the military for almost a century now.  The question comes in how they will be used and what level of autonomy will they be given.  UAS are extremely useful tools of war and in most cases there is nothing morally wrong in their use, even in killing targets as long as a human is “in-the-loop” and making those kill decisions.  It becomes morally wrong when there is no human in the kill decision.  No unmanned system should ever be allowed to fire at targets without direct human involvement. 

 


References



 

Thursday, March 5, 2015

Civilian UAS Operator Selection

This paper required looking at how to select crewmembers for commercial flight operations using both the Insitu ScanEagle UAS and the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper variant Ikhana.  The mission would be oceanic research with both aircraft .  While no current regulations are written to define the requirements for commercial use of these aircraft possible requirements can be extrapolated from current sources.  Some of these sources include the DCMA Instruction 8210.1, Unmanned Aircraft Pilot Medical and Certification Requirements by Kevin Williams, Ph.D, and the recently released proposed sUAS rules from the FAA.


                                                      Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University



Introduction

While there have been no formal rules for civilian UAS operator/pilot qualifications yet published for UAS the size of the ScanEagle or the Ikhana there are some sources that can be referenced to get an idea of what may be required.  There were some preliminary qualification standards as well as certification and medical standards published around 2007.  There is also the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Publication 8210.1 which lays out civilian contractor requirements to fly UAS for the military.  The FAA has recently released proposed rules for civilian commercial flight of UAS under 40 lbs.  These flight operations were fairly restrictive at under 400’ AGL and within VLOS (visual observer with good communications acceptable).  While these are small UAS, smaller even than the ScanEagle which is almost 50 lbs. when fully loaded possible requirements for larger UAS can be extrapolated with this guideline and other sources.

ScanEagle

The ScanEagle is a small UAS at 48.5 lbs. max takeoff weight and can carry and EO/IR payload.  This aircraft does have an extended endurance time of 24+ hours and ceiling of 19,500’ and a range of up to 55 NM from the control station. ("ScanEagle," 2013)  While these capabilities are impressive for such a small UAS the payload limitations and range would limit this UAS to VFR flights for this particular mission.

Because this would most likely be a VFR only operation the requirements would most like be having to pass a VFR knowledge test as well as meeting the qualification requirements for the aircraft, either civilian (if available) or military. (Williams, n.d., p. 3)  Ideally crewmembers would already be qualified on this aircraft with operational experience to minimize training time.  The operator would also need to have a safe flying record and associated references to their maturity and skill level.  If already qualified ScanEagle operators were not available operators with experience in similar systems and a minimum number of hours (i.e. 500 hrs. minimum UAS time) would be set so that training would be limited to airframe qualification.

Ikhana

The Ikhana is an MQ-9 Reaper variant which is designed to fly at approximately 40,000 to 45,000 with extensive payload capability. ("NASA Ikhana," 2008)  This is a research aircraft and will be used for maritime operations which means it will most likely be flown at high altitude requiring it to be flown under an IFR flight plan with an IFR rated pilot.  Current regulations military and government regulation for contractor pilots that fly outside restricted airspace are required to have at a minimum an FAA Commercial Pilot or Airline Transport Pilot Certificate.  However, this does not apply to UAS.  For UAS the regulation says that UAS pilots will meet Service (military service) requirements.  This means that if the UAS operator is qualified to fly the UAS for that branch of service they are authorized the aircraft. (Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA], 2013, Chapter 4) Particular cases such as flying IFR will currently be stipulated in the Certificate of Authorization (COA) and will usually require the pilot to have at least a Private Pilot Certificate and IFR rating with 100 hours PIC time.

Looking to future requirements gong along with the trend of the recent proposed requirements for flying sUAS the pilots for this aircraft would most likely require the pilot to pass at least a written UAS IFR flight test as well as passing a flight review with the aircraft, currency requirements, and hour requirements. (Williams, n.d., p. 3)  For this system if a UAS specific IFR rating is not yet available it would require the Ikhana pilots/operators to have at a minimum a Commercial Pilot Certificate with an IFR rating.  This is to allow the aircraft to fly under IFR flight plans, provide the required level of knowledge and training, and permit commercial operations with the aircraft.

Training and Qualification and Selection

The pilots will need to undergo regular proficiency flights, recurrent flight evaluations, and regular academic testing to ensure a high level of proficiency.  Flight operations would have a minimum number of hours that must be flow (either quarterly or bi-annually), regular no-notice examinations, and a yearly comprehensive proficiency test to ensure continued pilot safety as well knowledge and skill retention.

The selection process would include a written flight aptitude test such as used by the Global Pilot Selection System, or modeled after a military flight aptitude test. (Global Pilot Selection System, 2011)  Simulator flights would need to be done to determine the potential operators flight skills, knowledge, and ability to handle emergencies.  Evaluation of crew resource management understanding and application would also be implemented.

 

 


References